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A KAFKAESQUE PROCESS? FERC JURISDICTION
DURING CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY
Richard E.B. Dornfeld* and Cory J. Marsolek**
[A] correct understanding of a matter and a
misunderstanding of the same matter are not mutually
exclusive.
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FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 122 (DER PROZESS) (David Wyllie trans., Dover Thrift Editions
ed. 2009) (1925) (detailing a surreal account of an ordinary person’s prosecution by a
mindless and incomprehensible legal system); see infra note 241, Mem. Decision on Action
for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 19; In re PG&E Corp., 603 B.R. 471, 484 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Imagine the absurdity of the exclusive appeal route espoused by FERC .
. . . Kafka might have designed it[.]”).
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INTRODUCTION

Wildfires have ravaged California in recent years. In 2018, blazes
across the state killed eighty-six people and caused more than $9 billion in
property damage. The year before, in 2017, wildfires killed forty people
and caused at least $10 billion in property damage. California’s inverse
condemnation law holds Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E), the
state’s largest gas and electric utility, liable for much of the damage. Yet,
California’s adverse regulatory environment makes cost recovery from
customers unlikely. As a result, PG&E, along with its parent company, filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in January 2019 for debts anticipated to exceed
$51 billion. Fire victims and shareholders, however, are not the only ones
who could suffer. At the time of filing bankruptcy, PG&E had more than
380 long-term contracts with independent power producers worth $42
billion. Under Chapter 11, PG&E could “reject” any of these contracts as
part of its bankruptcy, leaving its suppliers with unsecured claims. This
2
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2

Andrew Scheeler, These Three 2018 California Wildfires Caused More Than $9 Billion
in Damage, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politicsgovernment/capitol-alert/article222997430.html [https://perma.cc/KCC8-H3NJ].
3
See Rong-Gong Lin II & Paige St. John, From Extreme Drought to Record Rain: Why
California’s Drought-to-Deluge Cycle Is Getting Worse, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2017),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-record-rains-20170410-story.html
[https://perma.cc/UQ4X-ANUK]; Lauren Tierney, The Grim Scope of 2017’s California
Wildfire Season Is Now Clear. The Danger’s Not Over., WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/national/california-wildfires-comparison/
[https://perma.cc/RS3Z-U23T].
4
Zach Wichter, California’s Largest Utility Says It Is Bankrupt. Here’s What You Need to
Know., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/business/pgebankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/P4JB-KU3S].
5
Hudson Sangree, California Wildfire Bill Goes to Governor, RTO INSIDER (Sept. 1, 2018),
https://www.rtoinsider.com/california-sb-901-wildfire-jerry-brown-99037/
[https://perma.cc/YJ22-BSVV] (leaving California’s doctrine of inverse condemnation that
“holds utilities strictly liable for fire damage” undisturbed and providing only one-time relief
to utilities).
6
PG&E’s Voluntary Pet. for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy at 5, In re PG&E Corp.
and Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., No. 19-30088 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2019).
7
Gavin Blade, FERC Reasserts Authority Over PG&E Contracts in Bankruptcy Court Filing,
UTILITYDIVE.COM (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ferc-reassertsauthority-over-pge-contracts-in-bankruptcy-court-filing/548701/
[https://perma.cc/P5Y3BMF6].
8
PG&E recently expressed its commitment to retain these contracts, despite suggestions that
the company “likely would reject some of its legacy renewable energy contracts signed at
above-market prices.” Garrett Hering, PG&E Provides Glimpse of Restructuring Plan,
Keeping All Energy Contracts, S&P GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/FVFVuk6ctyU-
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concern is not hypothetical. In fact, some PG&E suppliers saw their credit
ratings reduced to “junk status” in anticipation that their long-term contracts
could be discarded during bankruptcy.
To avoid that outcome, NextEra Energy (NextEra), one of PG&E’s
contract suppliers, petitioned the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC or Commission) to order PG&E to obtain Commission approval
prior to rejecting any wholesale power purchase agreements. Both PG&E
and the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California assert that
the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. FERC, on
the other hand, has argued it retains concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction
over the contracts. This dispute is the focus of this article; namely, whether
FERC can exercise jurisdiction over wholesale power purchase contracts
when a public utility or independent power producer declares bankruptcy.
This article argues that FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale
power purchase contracts because Congress intended for the Commission,
pursuant to the Federal Power Act (FPA), to exercise plenary authority over
interstate energy markets. Moreover, Mission Product Holdings Inc. v.
Tempnology, LLC suggests the Bankruptcy Code should not be read to the
exclusion of other fonts of federal law. This article also argues that to the
extent federal courts fail to respect FERC’s exercise of jurisdiction, Congress
should enact legislation that clearly demarcates the boundaries between the
Federal Power Act and the Bankruptcy Code.
9

10

11

12

Me_dZIGOtA2 [https://perma.cc/W3QZ-AYNT]. Regardless of the outcome in PG&E’s
case, this issue will likely remain relevant as climate change increases the frequency and
severity of adverse weather events. The Wall Street Journal, among others, has described
PG&E’s predicament as “the first climate-change bankruptcy” though “probably not the last.”
Russell Gold, PG&E: The First Climate-Change Bankruptcy, Probably Not the Last, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-wildfires-and-the-first-climatechange-bankruptcy-11547820006 [https://perma.cc/R6M7-9HQT] (“PG&E Corp.’s
bankruptcy could mark a business milestone: the first major corporate casualty of climate
change. Few people expect it will be the last.”).
9
Jeffrey Ryser, Topaz Solar, A Top Power Supplier to PG&E, Downgraded to Junk, S&P
GLOBAL
MARKET
INTELLIGENCE
(Jan.
11,
2019),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/newsinsights/trending/MJKZ4w6iUad3zMBuR_JyZA2 [https://perma.cc/6Y6W-DMB9].
10
Pet. for Declaratory Order & Compl. ¶ 61,049, NextEra Energy, Inc. v. Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co., 166 FERC (Jan. 18, 2019) (No. EL19-35-000).
11
In re PG&E Corp., 603 B.R. 471, 479 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019).
12
NextEra Energy, Inc. v. Pac. Gas & Elec., 166 FERC ¶ 61,049 (Jan. 25, 2019); Br. for
Appellant FERC at 38, In re PG&E Corp., Nos. 19-16833, 19-16834 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2019)
(“The Federal Power Act gives the Commission exclusive authority to regulate the sale of
[electric] energy at wholesale in interstate commerce[.]” (citing 16 U.S.C. §§824(a), 824d(a))).

4
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Ultimately, the preservation of FERC authority is important to ensure
uniform interpretation of FPA jurisdictional contracts and, conversely, to
avoid the risks associated with bankruptcy courts across the country
exclusively rendering judgment without reference to the Federal Power Act.
The ex post elimination of FERC jurisdiction would allow defaulting parties,
with the assistance of the bankruptcy courts, to engage in unanticipated risk
allocation shifting. Although the practical consequences are uncertain, the
possibility of risk shifting could hinder the further decline of renewable
energy prices by injecting fresh uncertainty into capital investment decision
making. In turn, higher costs and greater market uncertainty presumably
would disincentivize investment at a time when many states and public
utilities are relying on independent power producers to help achieve
renewable energy mandates.
In order to provide a framework for these arguments, this article first
provides a brief overview of the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Power Act,
and wholesale energy markets. Second, this article discusses the filed rate
and Mobile-Sierra doctrines that inform the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction.
Third, this article reviews prior cases involving disputes between FERC and
bankruptcy courts. Fourth, this article explains why FERC may exercise
exclusive jurisdiction and why the Supreme Court’s holdings in NextWave
and Bildisco provide little guidance for resolving jurisdictional disputes
between FERC and the bankruptcy courts. Finally, this article concludes
that exclusive FERC jurisdiction over wholesale power purchase contracts
is warranted as both a matter of law and policy.
13

14

15

16

17

18

II. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, FEDERAL POWER ACT, AND ENERGY
MARKETS
This section is intended to provide a brief outline of the Bankruptcy
Code and the Federal Power Act. These federal statutory schemes
respectively grant the bankruptcy courts and FERC jurisdiction over their
relevant subject matters. Additionally, this section gives an overview of
wholesale energy markets.

13

HJ Mai, Renewable Energy Prices Keep Falling: When Do They Bottom Out?, UTILITY
DIVE (May 30, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/renewable-energy-prices-keepfalling-when-do-they-bottom-out/555822/ [https://perma.cc/3G3T-K2LX].
14
Infra Part II.
15
Infra Part III.
16
Infra Part IV.
17
Infra Part V.
18
Infra Part VI.
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A. The Bankruptcy Code
The Bankruptcy Code is broad in its scope. The Supreme Court has
explained, “Congress intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the
bankruptcy courts so that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with
all matters connected with the bankruptcy estate.” To that end, the Code
grants district courts exclusive jurisdiction over “all the property, wherever
located, of the debtor as of the commencement of . . . [a bankruptcy] case,
and of property of the estate.” It also provides the district court original,
albeit not exclusive, jurisdiction over civil proceedings arising under Chapter
11. However, this conferral of jurisdiction does not preclude an agency
from commencing or continuing a proceeding to enforce its regulatory
power.
Most relevant to this article is the Chapter 11 business reorganization.
Chapter 11’s ultimate purpose “is to permit successful rehabilitation of
debtors.” It allows the debtor to serve as a “debtor-in-possession” and act
as a bankruptcy estate’s trustee. Chapter 11 directs the trustee to formulate
a “plan,” that is, a blueprint for how creditors will be paid. As part of a
reorganization, section 365(a) allows the debtor to reject “all executory
contracts,” meaning contracts that have not yet been fully performed,
“except those expressly exempted,” subject to approval by the bankruptcy
court. It also is important to note that Chapter 11 plans divide creditors
into various “classes” that provide for when and how the creditors will be
19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

19

Celotex v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 43 F.2d 984,
994 (3d Cir. 1984)).
20
28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1) (2017).
21
Id. § 1334(b).
22
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2018); see also Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp
Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 39–40 (1991).
23
N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984).
24
See JOAN N. FEENEY ET AL., Bankruptcy Law Manual § 11:8 (5th ed. 2019) (“The debtor
in possession has the power to operate the debtor’s business with the protection of the
automatic stay without a court order, has the powers given to a trustee, including avoidance
powers and rejection of burdensome executory contracts, and is obligated to perform the
functions and duties of a trustee.”).
25
See WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. 3d
§ 3:14 (2019) (“[T]he ultimate objective of the debtor in a Chapter 11 case is to have the
court confirm the plan of reorganization it proposes . . . . The plan of reorganization becomes
the contract between the debtor and its creditors in respect of all obligations the debtor has
as of the date of confirmation . . . . [T]herefore, [it] will subsume those terms and conditions
which allows for a return to prepetition terms and conditions.”).
26
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 521.
27
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2018).
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paid. While Chapter 11 bankruptcy entails other complexities, the bottom
line, for the purposes of this article, is that a debtor may discard contracts
and the bankruptcy estate creditor may only receive a fraction of the contract
value following rejection.
The final Bankruptcy Code provision that warrants consideration is
the automatic stay under section 362(a). The automatic stay stops all
collection efforts against a debtor once the debtor files a bankruptcy
petition. The stay, with exceptions not relevant to this article, applies to
“[a]ny postpetition act to collect a prepetition claim . . . whether the act is
direct against the debtor, property of the debtor, or property of the estate.”
The stay, however, is not invincible. It does not apply to governmental
entities enacting or continuing enforcement actions under their regulatory
authority.
28

29

30

31

32

33

34

28

See FEENEY ET AL., supra note 24, at § 11:48 (“A plan must designate classes of claims and
interests . . . . Claims and interests are separated into different classes depending on their
legal characteristics. Classification must be based on the nature of the claims or interests and
the members of each class must have claims or interests that are substantially similar to the
others in that class so that voting on the plan will be representative.”).
29
Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1658 (2019) (“Section
365(g) places that party in the same boat as the debtor’s unsecured creditors, who in a typical
bankruptcy may receive only cents on the dollar.”). According to a study published by the
American Banking Institute, “[f]or businesses with assets above $5 million, unsecured
creditors typically collect half of what they are owed. Where the business’s assets are worth
less than $200,000, ordinary general creditors usually recover nothing.” Douglas Baird et al.,
The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical Study 1 (Nov. 2005),
http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/priority.pdf [https://perma.cc/5279-EEZL].
30
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2018).
31
See id.; FEENEY ET AL., supra note 24, at § 11:33 (“An important benefit that a Chapter 11
debtor receives upon the filing of the petition is the automatic stay . . . . The purposes of the
automatic stay are to: 1) prevent harassment and the financial pressures of indebtedness; 2)
avoid the dissipation of assets and interference with the estate; and 3) ensure that similarly
situated creditors are treated equally.”); Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 17
(1995) (“Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), [the debtor’s] bankruptcy filing gave rise to an automatic
stay of various types of activity by his creditors.”).
32
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(ii) (allowing the post-petition collection of spousal and child
support); 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (authorizing the filing of a U.C.C. article 9 continuation
statement for a secured creditor to maintain perfection of a security interest).
33
STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK & GREGORY M. DUHL, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 272 (3d ed. 2017) (emphasis omitted); see 11 U.S.C. §§
362(a)(1)–(7).
34
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4); see also Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin.,
Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 39–40 (1991).
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The Federal Power Act

The Federal Power Act provides the competing body of law at the
heart of the jurisdictional conflict between FERC and the bankruptcy courts.
The FPA’s origins provide some insight into FERC’s broad authority in the
context of wholesale power purchase contracts. Electric service initially was
a local affair with generation facilities serving customers in their immediate
vicinity. As a result, state and municipal governments took a leading role in
regulating the nascent industry. Local regulation eventually experienced
challenges as transmission systems matured and urban development
brought previously distinct communities—particularly in the northeastern
United States—into contact with each other. These changes meant that a
utility based and regulated in one state could sell its electricity to a second
state that lacked the authority to regulate its prices.
In 1927, the issue reached the Supreme Court in Public Utilities
Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co. A decade earlier, Rhode
Island-based Narragansett Electric Lighting Company (Narragansett)
entered into a twenty-year contract to provide Massachusetts-based
Attleboro Steam & Electric Company (Attleboro) with “all the electricity
required by the Attleboro Company . . . at a specified basic rate.”
Narragansett filed with Rhode Island regulators “a schedule setting out the
rate and general terms of the contract and was authorized . . . to grant the
Attleboro Company the special rate.” However, by 1924, Narragansett
became dissatisfied with the rate and successfully secured approval from
Rhode Island to increase it. Understandably, Attleboro was unhappy with
the new arrangement and challenged the authority of Rhode Island
regulators to dictate prices of electricity transmitted in interstate commerce.
35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

35

New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (“When the Federal Power Act (FPA) became law
in 1935, most electric utilities operated as separate, local monopolies subject to state or local
regulation . . . there was little competition among utility companies.”).
36
Sam Kalen, Muddling Through Modern Energy Policy: The Dormant Commerce Clause
and Unmasking the Illusion of an Attleboro Line, 24 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 283, 291–92
(2017) (describing how electrical grids expanded from urban centers into surrounding areas
and nearby states).
37
Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 408–409
(2016).
38
Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927), abrogated by
Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375 (1983).
39
Id. at 84.
40
Id. at 84–85.
41
Id. at 85.
42
Id. at 86.
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed with Attleboro. The Court
held, “[t]he transmission of electric current from one state to another . . . is
interstate commerce.” The Court explained, “‘the commerce clause . . .
restrains the states from imposing direct burdens upon interstate
commerce,’ and a state enactment imposing such a ‘direct burden’ must
fall.’” However, there was a catch: “[t]he forwarding state obviously has no
more authority than the receiving state to place a direct burden upon
interstate commerce.” Thus, a regulatory gap was created that neither state
could fill.
Congress eventually passed the Federal Power Act of 1935 to fill the
“Attleboro gap.” However, the FPA does more than fill space created by
Attleboro. The FPA extends FERC jurisdiction beyond interstate
transmission (the issue in Attleboro) to all wholesale contracts. To that end,
section 201 of the FPA grants “[t]he Commission . . . jurisdiction over all
facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy” at wholesale in
interstate commerce. Section 203 provides that FERC must approve a
proposed disposition if it finds that the disposition “will be consistent with
the public interest.” Moreover, Congress directed the Federal Power
Commission (FERC’s predecessor) in section 205 to ensure “[a]ll rates and
charges made, demanded, or received . . . in connection with the
transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission . . . be just and reasonable.” Additionally, in section 206,
Congress gave the Federal Power Commission authority to revise contracts
“[w]henever the Commission . . . [finds] that any rate . . . or contract affecting
such rate . . . is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or
preferential[.]” As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained, “the Act .
. . entrusts a broad subject-matter to administration by the Commission,
43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

43

Id.
Id.
45
Id. at 88 (quoting Minnesota Rates Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 396 (1913)).
46
Id. at 90.
47
16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2018); see Rossi, supra note 37 at 409 (explaining that the “Attleboro
44

gap” is “a regulatory void where neither the forwarding state nor the receiving state could
regulate the pricing of electricity sold across state lines.”).
48
New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 17 (2002) (“There is no language in the statute limiting
FERC’s transmission jurisdiction to the wholesale market, although the statute does limit
FERC’s sale jurisdiction to that at wholesale.”).
49
16 U.S.C. § 824(b).
50
16 U.S.C. § 824b(a)(4) (2018).
51
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2018).
52
16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018).
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subject to Congressional oversight,” to achieve Congress’ policy objectives.
The Supreme Court has similarly interpreted the FPA to eliminate any
question regarding FERC’s primacy with regards to wholesale energy in
interstate commerce. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that FERC “has
exclusive authority to regulate ‘the sale of electric energy at wholesale in
interstate commerce.’”
53

54

C.

Wholesale Energy Markets

Traditionally, the Attleboro example aside, electric utilities owned and
operated all of the facilities they needed to generate, transmit, and distribute
electricity to retail customers. However, in response to a series of energy
shortages in the 1970s, Congress enacted the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 to spur the development of new generation
facilities. PURPA section 210 directs FERC to adopt rules requiring
electric utilities to: “(1) sell electric energy to qualifying cogeneration
facilities and qualifying small power production facilities and (2) purchase
electric energy from such facilities.” FERC subsequently adopted rules that
require electric utilities to purchase “any energy and capacity which is made
55

56

53

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 379 F.2d 153, 158–59 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (“[T]he breadth of agency discretion is, if anything, at zenith when the action assailed
relates primarily not to the issue of ascertaining whether conduct violates the statute, or
regulations, but rather to the fashioning of policies, remedies and sanctions . . . in order to
arrive at maximum effectuation of Congressional objectives.”).
54
Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1292 (2016) (quoting 16 U.S.C. §
824(b)(1) (2015)); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986)
(“FERC clearly has exclusive jurisdiction over the rates to be charged Nantahala’s interstate
wholesale customers.”); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 22 (2002) (explaining that “the FPA
contains such ‘a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction’ to FERC over interstate
transmissions” that a mere policy declaration cannot nullify it) (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n
v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964)); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S.
Ct. 760, 776 (2016) (“[A] FERC regulation does not run afoul of [the Federal Power Act]
just because it affects—even substantially—the quantity or terms of retail sales. It is a fact of
economic life that the wholesale and retail markets in electricity, as in every other known
product, are not hermetically sealed from each other.”).
55
Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (July
15,
2002),
https://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-solutions/strengthenpolicy/public-utility-regulatory.html [https://perma.cc/UM9Q-KHK5] (“The Public Utility
Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) was passed in 1978, in the midst of the energy crises that
ripped through industrial world economies. Faced with predictions that the price of oil would
rise to $100 a barrel, Congress acted to reduce dependence on foreign oil, to promote
alternative energy sources and energy efficiency, and to diversify the electric power
industry.”).
56
16 U.S.C. § 824a–3(a) (2018).

10
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available from a qualifying facility” that is listed at a certain price. This price
is known as the “avoided costs” rate. The avoided costs rate is a rate not
exceeding the incremental cost that the utility would incur by generating the
next unit of energy or capacity itself or purchasing it from another source.
Thus, under PURPA as originally enacted, an independent power producer
could construct a generation facility and require an electric utility to enter a
wholesale contract to purchase the electricity, assuming the price does not
exceed the avoided cost rate and the new facility meets PURPA’s Qualifying
Facility (QF) requirements.
Wholesale power purchase contracts may include a variety of
provisions intended to address matters beyond price. These agreements
often address issues including performance standards for construction;
commercial operation deadlines; allocation of the risk of loss during
transmission to a delivery point; reliability and technical standards; the
issues of curtailment, excess capacity, and output guarantees; limitation of
the remedies available following a default; allocation of taxes and other
expenses; and which party will receive benefits, such as renewable energy
production credits, air-quality and emissions-reduction credits, offsets, and
allowances. Even within the price or quantity provisions, wholesale power
purchase contracts may not employ flat-rate or per capita terms. Instead,
prices and quantities may be intended to float based on factors such as time
of day, time of year, forecasted or real-time market demand, or capacity.
57

58

59

60

61

57

18 C.F.R. § 292.303 (2019).
18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6) (2019). Economic theory suggests that “[a] firm desiring to
maximize its profits will . . . determine its level of output by continuing production until the
cost of the last additional unit produced (marginal cost) just equals the addition to revenue
(marginal revenue) obtained from it.” Cost, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Jun. 18, 2008),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/cost [https://perma.cc/NYR4-YXZM]. The avoided cost
rate is intended to spur additional capacity development by requiring utilities to purchase
energy from independent producers when the contract price is below the amount at which
the marginal cost and revenue intersect.
59
18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6) (2019).
60
See, e.g., Power Purchase Agreement for the Purchase of Renewable Energy, GOLDEN
SPREAD ELEC. COOP. (last visited Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.gsec.coop/getmedia/08b27ad0534d-4a7c-b8be-80843f8dba57/ERCOT-QF-PPA.aspx
[https://perma.cc/TEA5-AJV6];
PG&E Form of Power Purchase Agreement, PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. CO. (last visited Oct. 14,
2019),
https://www.pge.com/includes/docs/word_xls/b2b/wholesaleelectricsuppliersolicitation/RPS
2011/Attachment_H1_PGE_RPS_PPA_05112011.doc [https://perma.cc/8EHB-MM97];
Model Wind Energy Purchase Agreement, XCEL ENERGY (last visited Sept. 4, 2019),
https://www.xcelenergy.com/staticfiles/xe/Corporate/Corporate%20PDFs/Model_Power_P
urchase_Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/U97B-CRC8].
61
Id.
58
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Overall, PURPA had the desired effect. Independent power
producers have added more than 1.4 billion megawatt hours in generation
capacity, approximately a 4500% increase, since 1990. In particular, for
renewables, PURPA helped spur independent power producers to add 263
million megawatt hours of wind and solar generation capacity, an
approximately 8300% increase, during the same time period. These are
significant developments—one megawatt is sufficient to power
approximately 750 to 1000 average American homes. These figures
62

63

64

65

62

In addition to PURPA, wholesale energy market development was fostered by the passage
of the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, 106 Stat.
2776. Section 721 granted FERC authority to require wholesale market participants to
provide transmission services when it would be consistent with the Federal Power Act and
the public interest. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, title VII, § 721. In
addition, the legislation took steps to eliminate regulatory barriers to greater wholesale
competition. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, § 721 (abolishing the Federal
Power Act, § 211(c)(1)). Subsequently, in the mid-to-late 1990s, FERC issued a series of
orders, most notably Order No. 888 and Order No. 2000, which were intended to improve
competition through improved transmission facility access. FERC Order No. 888, 18 C.F.R.
§§ 35, 385, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080 (1996) (promoting wholesale competition through open
access non-discriminatory transmission services by public utilities and recovery of stranded
costs by public utilities); FERC Order No. 2000, 18 C.F.R. § 35, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (1999)
(requiring that public utilities that own, operate, or control facilities for the transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce make certain filings with respect to forming and
participating in a regional transmission organization). Then again, after the enactment of the
Energy Policy Act of 2005, FERC issued Orders No. 681, 679, and 890, which further
reformed transmission service regulations to support wholesale market competition. Energy
Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58 § 1231; FERC Order No. 681, 18 C.F.R. § 42, 116
FERC ¶ 61,077 (2006) (requiring transmission organizations that are public utilities with
organized electricity markets to make available long-term firm transmission rights in
accordance with the rule); FERC Order No. 679, 18 C.F.R. § 35, 116 FERC ¶ 61,057 (2006)
(establishing incentive-based rate treatments for the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce by public utilities for the purpose of benefiting consumers by ensuring
reliability and reducing the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission congestion);
FERC Order No. 890, 18 C.F.R. §§ 35, 37, 72 FERC ¶ 12,266 (2007) (amending the
regulations and the pro forma open access transmission tariff to ensure that transmission
services are provided on a basis that is just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or
preferential).
63
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Net Generation by State by Type of Producer
by
Energy
Source
(Annual
Data
1990-2018)
(Oct.
12,
2018),
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/state/ [https://perma.cc/MC7K-FA2W].
64
65

Id.

U.S. Energy Information Administration, How Much Electricity Does an American Home
Use?
(Oct.
26,
2018),
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=97&t=3
[https://perma.cc/6GS4-5AQC] (“In 2018, the average annual electricity consumption for a
U.S. residential utility customer was 10,972 kilowatt-hours (kWh), an average of about 914
kWh per month.”).
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illustrate the important role that independent power producers and
wholesale power purchase contracts have played in the diversification of the
American electricity industry and the development of renewable energy
resources.
On the whole, independent power producers and wholesale power
purchase contracts have become ubiquitous features of the American
electric industry. Independent power producers are often smaller than
traditional utilities, lightly regulated (at least relative to traditional utilities),
and better able—or more willing—to accept market risk. It is likely that
independent power producers and wholesale power purchase contracts will
be an essential component of any state or traditional utility’s renewable
energy strategy. Thus, an independent power producer may make an
investment in a new solar or wind generation facility to support a traditional
66

67

66

Despite PURPA’s impact, the legislation faces criticism. Both industry groups, such as the
Edison Electric Institute (EEI) and associations representing state regulators, like the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), have urged Congress
and FERC to adopt reforms that would make PURPA more compatible with modern,
competitive energy markets. In particular, both groups have expressed concern that PURPA
needlessly increases costs. For example, as a result of the avoided cost rate connection
requirement, EEI reports “Pacificorp and Duke Energy customers are expected to pay $1.2
billion and $1 billion, respectively, above market price for their energy” over the next decade.
Iulia Gheorghiu, EEI Presses FERC for Faster, Streamlined PURPA Review, UTILITY DIVE
(Feb. 6, 2019) https://www.utilitydive.com/news/eei-presses-ferc-for-faster-streamlinedpurpa-review/547741/ [https://perma.cc/SA3N-9FMJ]. In response, NARUC, and groups
like it, have proposed that “regulations that move away from the use of administratively
determined avoided costs to their measurement through competitive solicitations or market
clearing prices.” Abby Harvey, NARUC Calls on FERC to Prioritize PURPA Reform,
POWER MAGAZINE (Dec. 20, 2017) https://www.powermag.com/naruc-calls-on-ferc-toprioritize-purpa-reform/ [https://perma.cc/865Y-28Y8]. As this article was being written,
FERC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking intended to modernize PURPA. Press
Release, FERC, FERC Proposes to Modernize PURPA Regulations (Sept. 19, 2019),
https://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2019/2019-3/09-19-19-E-1.asp
[https://perma.cc/R7WM-EH5N].
67
Ezra Hausman, Rick Hornby & Allison Smith, Bilateral Contracting in Deregulated
Electricity Markets, in A REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION, 1 (Apr.
18,
2008),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=D312AF0B9279226D4D0EDC6
53CFAD604?doi=10.1.1.179.1344&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/N59W-8V8F]
(“A bilateral contract in an electricity market is an agreement between a willing buyer and a
willing seller to exchange electricity, rights to generating capacity, or a related product under
mutually agreeable terms for a specified period of time. Most economists agree that such
arrangements are crucial to the functioning of electricity markets, because they allow both
parties to have the price stability and certainty necessary to perform long-term planning and
to make rational and socially optimal investments.”).
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utility’s compliance with a state renewable energy mandate. In turn, the
independent power producer relies on a long-term contract with the utility
to recoup its investment over an extended term. However, these features,
which make independent power producers more responsive to changing
market and regulatory demands, place them at a greater risk of adverse
financial consequences when a wholesale power purchase contract is
rejected during a utility bankruptcy.
68

69

70

III. FILED RATE AND MOBILE-SIERRA DOCTRINES

A. Filed Rate Doctrine
Against this regulatory backdrop, utilities in the United States
historically have operated as government-sanctioned monopolies; namely,
in recognition that a single firm may be able to more efficiently allocate
electric, gas, and telecommunication capital costs than a competitive
market. In return for this monopoly power, utilities generally are subject to
duties that firms engaged in market competition can avoid. Chief among
71

68

Id. at 11 (“Bilateral contracts are particularly important to the development of utility-scale
renewable resources. These resources tend to be extremely capital intensive, and hence
heavily weighted towards up-front costs, since they have no or limited fuel and emissions
costs during their operating lives. The absence of fuel and emissions costs makes these
resources particularly attractive for hedging future fuel and emissions price risks as part of a
portfolio of resources to serve load. However, this avoided risk only benefits ratepayers if
they are passed through—i.e., through long-term, fixed-price contracts. In many cases,
approval of new environmentally attractive resources hinges on a contract structure that offers
this benefit to ratepayers.”).
69
Id. at 12 (“Contracts of at least [five years] (and more likely ten years or more) are required
to provide the level of revenue guarantee that developers need to finance new resources,
which is one of the most important functions of these contracts.”). See also id. at 17
(“Because most of the cost of renewables is up-front capital cost, renewable resources are
particularly dependent on long-term contracts for energy, capacity, and RECs.”).
70
71

Id.

However, single firm control is not always a given, particularly in the context of generation
and transmission. See supra Section II.C. (discussing the development of independent
power producers after the passage of Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978).
Additionally, thirteen states have “deregulated” or restructured their energy markets to break
previously vertically integrated utilities into their component parts. U.S. Energy Info. Admin,
Electricity Residential Retail Choice Participation Has Declined Since 2014 Peak (Nov. 8,
2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37452 [https://perma.cc/N2ANHFHB] (“Currently, 13 states and the District of Columbia have active, statewide residential
retail choice programs . . . . Four other states—Michigan, Nevada, Oregon, and Virginia—
each have a form of limited retail choice that is mostly available to non-residential
customers.”).
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these responsibilities are the duties to serve and to set reasonable prices.
Accordingly, utilities typically must secure regulatory approval of their
contracts, called tariffs, with retail customers and wholesale suppliers. Once
the tariff is approved, utilities, customers, and suppliers must act consistently
with it because deviations could unjustly benefit one party at the expense of
another.
The filed rate doctrine arises from this paradigm by “requir[ing] the
courts to respect the public agency’s control over market prices and industry
practices[.]” The file rate doctrine, thus, establishes a regulatory duty or
obligation arising from the filed rate that is separate and superior to any
private contractual duty. As a result, after the filed rate is approved, an
aggrieved party’s primary remedy is any process provided by the
administrative agency. While the filed rate doctrine was first employed in
the context of the Interstate Commerce Act, which subjected railroads to
federal regulation, it is now widely applied by state and federal agencies to
regulated utilities. The Supreme Court has recognized FERC’s authority to
employ the doctrine in the context of wholesale electricity contracts filed
with the Commission under FPA section 201(b)(1) for more than sixty
72

73

74

75

72

See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of Consumers in
an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1236
(1998) (“[P]ublic utilities are obligated—largely as conditions of their monopoly franchises—
to provide service to all customers within their service territories, sometimes even when the
cost of providing service to a customer is in excess of the anticipated revenue from that
customer.”).
73
Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 144–45 (1990) (“[M]oreover,
it significantly reduces the temptation of regulated parties to deviate from the market-wide
rules formulated by the agency.”); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore,
487 U.S. 354, 375 (1988) (“The reasonableness of rates and agreements regulated by FERC
may not be collaterally attacked in state or federal courts. The only appropriate forum for
such a challenge is before the Commission or a court reviewing the Commission’s order.”);
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981) (holding that the filed rate
doctrine forbids a regulated entity from charging rates for its services other than those
properly filed with the appropriate federal regulatory authority).
74
See, e.g., New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. York & Whitney Co., 256 U.S.
406, 408 (1921) (“The transaction between the parties amounted to an assumption by the
consignee to pay the only lawful rate it had the right to pay or the carrier the right to charge[:]
[the rate filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission[.]”); Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v.
International Coal Min. Co., 230 U.S. 184, 197 (1913) (“The tariff, so long as it was of force,”
was “to be treated as though it had been a statute, binding as such upon railroad and shipper
alike,” and “the shipper was . . . bound to pay and the carrier to retain what had been paid.”).
75
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 577. (“The filed rate doctrine has its origins in
this Court’s cases interpreting the Interstate Commerce Act . . . and has been extended across
the spectrum of regulated utilities.”).
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years. The Court has explained, consistent with other agency deference
doctrines, “[t]he considerations underlying the [filed rate] doctrine . . . are
preservation of the agency’s primary jurisdiction over reasonableness of
rates and the need to insure that regulated companies charge only those
rates of which the agency has been made cognizant.”
The meaning of “rate” in the filed rate doctrine is expansive.
Wholesale power purchase contracts, which are the focus of this article,
include a variety of terms not directly related to per unit costs, including
facility siting and construction, delivery and interconnection arrangements,
forced outages, capacity and service guarantees, third-party sales, and
renewable energy credit ownership. Along these lines, the Supreme Court
has made clear, “the filed rate doctrine is not limited to ‘rates’ per se[.]”
The Court subsequently reasoned, “[r]ates . . . do not exist in isolation. They
have meaning only when one knows the services to which they are attached.
Any claim for excessive rates can be couched as a claim for inadequate
services and vice versa.” Thus, for wholesale power purchase contracts
subject to FERC approval, the doctrine may provide an additional barrier
to state regulatory interference, anti-trust claims, and challenges by
contracting parties with regret or the benefit of hindsight.
76

77

78

79

80

81

76

16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2018); Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S.
246, 251 (1951) (“[T]he right to a reasonable rate [under the Federal Power Act] is the right
to the rate which the Commission files or fixes[.]”).
77
See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding agency
interpretations should be upheld by the courts when a statute is ambiguous and the agency’s
construction is permissible or reasonable); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)
(holding a federal agency’s determination is entitled to judicial respect according to the
interpretation’s persuasiveness).
78
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 577–78.
79
See supra Section II.C., notes 54–55. Similarly, for retail customers, the filed rate,
encompassed in the filed rate doctrine, often addresses matters such as service territory,
technical terms and conditions, rules and regulations, consumer rights, cogeneration and
distributed resources in addition to per unit price paid for natural gas or electricity. See, e.g.,
Rate
Books,
XCEL
ENERGY
(2019),
https://www.xcelenergy.com/company/rates_and_regulations/rates/rate_books
[https://perma.cc/25WT-Z5QS].
80
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) (“‘[O]ur inquiry is
not at an end because the orders do not deal in terms of prices or volumes of purchases.’”)
(quoting N. Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 84, 90–91 (1963)); see
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988)
(“FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction applies not only to rates but also to power allocations that
affect wholesale rates.”).
81
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Off. Tel., 524 U.S. 214, 223 (1998).
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Mobile-Sierra Doctrine

Since its introduction, the filed rate doctrine has continued to evolve.
The doctrine may even be applied when FERC does not specifically set or
approve the rate. FERC and its predecessor, the Federal Power
Commission, originally acted as a national government analog to state public
utilities commissions by directly reviewing contracts to ensure compliance
with the “just and reasonable” standard. Gradually, FERC has transitioned
from direct regulation to ensuring adequate market competition. This trend
has accelerated in the past few decades, coinciding with the passage of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act in 1978. The Supreme Court in
FERC v. Electrical Power Supply Association explained:
In this new world, FERC often forgoes the cost-based rate-setting
traditionally used to prevent monopolistic pricing. The
Commission instead undertakes to ensure “just and reasonable”
wholesale rates by enhancing competition—attempting . . . “to
break down regulatory and economic barriers that hinder a free
market in wholesale electricity.”
The Mobile–Sierra doctrine, which has its genesis in two 1956 cases,
helps accommodate this “new world.” In the first case, the Supreme Court
considered whether a natural gas transmission company under a long-term
contract with a distribution company could unilaterally “change the rate
specified in the contract simply by filing a new rate schedule with the Federal
Power Commission.” The Court ultimately held that because “the Natural
Gas Act gives a natural gas company no power to change its contracts
unilaterally, it follows that the new schedule . . . was a nullity insofar as it
purported to change the rate set by its [original] contract . . . and that
[original] contract rate remained the only lawful rate.”
The Court came to the same conclusion in the second case involving
a contract with a fifteen-year term between Sierra Pacific Power Company
and PG&E. When the parties entered the contract in 1948, PG&E provided
Sierra with “a special low rate” in an attempt to secure the business. By 1953,
82

83

84

85

86

82

16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018).
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645) (2018)); see supra Section II.C.
84
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 768 (2016) (quoting Morgan Stanley
Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 527, 536 (2008)).
85
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 333–34 (1956). It is
important to note that in Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, the Supreme Court recognized
that the Federal Power Act and Natural Gas Act are “substantially identical” and subject to
“interchangeabl[e]” precedent. 453 U.S. 571, 578 n.7 (1981).
86
United Gas Pipe Line Co., 350 U.S. at 347.
83
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PG&E was no longer able to profitably provide electricity at this special rate.
Like the transmission company in Mobile, PG&E unilaterally “filed with the
Commission under § 205(d) of the Federal Power Act a schedule
purporting to increase its rate to Sierra by approximately 28%.” Again, the
Supreme Court rejected the attempt to revise the contract by invoking the
Federal Power Commission’s responsibility to ensure “just and reasonable”
rates. The Court explained:
[T]he Commission holds that the contract rate is unreasonable
solely because it yields less than a fair return on the net invested
capital. But, while it may be that the Commission may not
normally impose upon a public utility a rate which would produce
less than a fair return, it does not follow that the public utility may
not itself agree by contract to a rate affording less than a fair return
or that, if it does so, it is entitled to be relieved of its improvident
bargain.
Thus, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, in many ways, is an extension of
basic contract law principles: parties are only entitled to the value of the
bargain they strike. Mobile-Sierra ensures that parties are not able to
accomplish through an administrative process what they could not achieve
through contract law. As the Court put it, “a contract may not be said to be
either ‘unjust’ or ‘unreasonable’ simply because it is unprofitable to the
public utility.” Instead, the Commission’s only duty in the case of an
“improvident bargain” is to consider “whether the rate is so low as to
adversely affect the public interest—as where it might impair the financial
ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other consumers
an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory.”
In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases later clarified that Mobile-Sierra
creates a presumption that authorized wholesale rates are “just and
reasonable” and that FERC may only abrogate such contracts “in
circumstances of unequivocal public necessity.” More recently, Morgan
87

88

89

90

91

Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish
County explained that setting aside a wholesale contract requires a finding
of “‘unequivocal public necessity,’ or ‘extraordinary circumstances,’”
regardless of whether the supplier or purchaser believes the rate is

87

Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 352 (1956).
Id. at 354–55.
89
Id. at 355.
90
Id.; see 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018).
91
In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 822 (1968).
88
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excessive. Moreover, the Court has extended Mobile-Sierra to bar
challenges by third parties to an approved rate.
The ultimate effect of the Supreme Court’s FPA jurisprudence is to
extend “FERC[’s] plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates” to
matters well beyond the traditional conception of a rate as “[a] price fixed
according to a ratio.” This is true even in cases where the Commission has
limited its wholesale contract review to an evaluation of each party’s relative
market power.
92

93

94

95

IV. FERC AND THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS
During the 1990s and early 2000s, state legislatures and public utility
commissions began to restructure retail electricity markets. Similarly,
during the same time period, Congress and FERC began enacting reforms
intended to increase market competition and reduce customer prices. The
result of this activity was enhanced market volatility that, in some cases,
resulted in bankruptcy. The following section discusses several
jurisdictional disputes between FERC and bankruptcy courts arising out of
these market changes. Most notably, this section discusses the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals’ In re Mirant decision.
96

97

98

99

92

Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S.
527, 550–51 (2008) (quoting In re Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 822 (1968); Arkansas
Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 582 (1981)).
93
NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, 168 (2010) (“The
‘venerable Mobile–Sierra doctrine’ rests on ‘the stabilizing force of contracts.’ To retain
vitality, the doctrine must control FERC itself, and, we hold, challenges to contract rates
brought by noncontracting as well as contracting parties.”) (quoting Morgan Stanley Capital
Grp. Inc., 554 U.S. at 548 (2008)); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S.
953, 953 (1986); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
94
Rate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (11th ed. 2003) (“[A] price fixed according to a ratio[.]”).
95
Thornburg, 476 U.S. at 953.
96
Katie Johnson, You Can’t Manage What You Can’t Measure: Exploring Restructuring’s
Impact on Retail-Electric Markets, 38 VT. L. REV. 199, 202 (2013).
97
Id. at 202–04 (2013) (summarizing energy market restructuring legislation).
98
See In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511, 516 (5th Cir. 2004).
99
Id. at 511. The most recent case addressing the intersection between the Bankruptcy Code
and the Federal Power Act, prior to the PG&E bankruptcy, is In re FirstEnergy Solutions
Corp. The FirstEnergy court relied largely on the reasoning from Mirant by concluding
“cessation of performance, does not intrude on FERC’s jurisdiction over filed rates.” No. 1850757, 2018 WL 2315916 at *17 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, May 18, 2018) (“If Plaintiffs were
solvent and simply stopped making payments . . . the counterparties could not reasonably
argue that [the debtors] had somehow modified or abrogated those agreements; they would
seek damages for the breaches of those contracts . . . . Those breaches would lead to claims.
If the Plaintiffs then filed bankruptcy, the claims would become claims against the estate.
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A. Mirant’s Argument
In 2004, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to consider
whether the Mirant Corporation (Mirant), a competitive energy company,
could reject a contract that it had previously entered into with Potomac
Electric Power Company (Pepco) incident to a broader transaction to
acquire Pepco’s electric generation facilities. The Mirant court ultimately
relied on two related arguments. First, Mirant could reject the contract
because it did not implicate the filed rate. Second, executory contract
rejection in bankruptcy results in a breach of contract beyond FERC’s
jurisdiction. Each of these arguments is discussed below.
100

101

102

1.

Mirant’s Consideration of the Filed Rate Doctrine

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals first considered whether the FPA
preempted rejection of the contracts due to FERC’s exclusive authority to
determine wholesale rates. The court concluded, “the FPA does not
preempt Mirant’s rejection of the [contract] because it would only have an
indirect effect upon the file rate.” The court explained that FERC’s
argument was “unpersuasive because it . . . does not challenge Mirant’s
ability to breach the [contract] generally, nor does it challenge the
calculation of damages from that breach.” In reaching this decision, the
Mirant court relied on its Gulf States reasoning, where the debtor was
allowed to seek damages based on certain provisions of a wholesale
agreement related to “the amount purchased.” In Gulf States, the court
repeatedly drew distinctions between rates, in the traditional sense, and
other contract terms such as quantity. Similarly, the Mirant court
explained, “courts are not preempted from awarding breach of contract
damages based upon a theory that the breach increased the amount that was
103

104

105

106

107

108

Treatment of those claims are governed by the Bankruptcy Code, including the confirmation
of a reorganization plan . . . .”); see infra Section IV.B.1.
100
See In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 511. Pepco was unable to assign all of its existing power
purchase contracts associated with the generation facilities as part of the sale. Id. at 515. To
resolve this issue, Pepco and Mirant entered into a “back-to-back” agreement where “Mirant
agreed to purchase from Pepco an amount of electricity equal to Pepco’s obligation under
those unassigned PPAs at the rates set in those contracts.” Id.
101
Id. at 518.
102
Id. at 525.
103
Id. at 519–20.
104
105
106

Id.
Id. at 521–22.

Gulf States Util. Co. v. Ala. Power Co., 824 F.2d 1465, 1471–72 (5th Cir. 1987).
Rate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (11th ed. 2003) (“[A] fixed ratio between two things.”).
108
Gulf States Util. Co., 824 F.2d at 1471–72
107
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purchased, so long as damages are calculated using the filed rate.” With
these distinctions drawn, the Fifth Circuit held that the non-debtor party,
following the contract’s rejection, receives an “unsecured claim against the
bankruptcy estate . . . based upon the amount of electricity it would have
otherwise sold to Mirant under that agreement at the filed rate.”
109

110

2.

Mirant’s “Rejection as Breach” Framework

After deciding that damages based on the contemplated electricity
purchases did not violate the filed rate doctrine, the Mirant court concluded
that a rejected contract results in a breach of contract claim that is beyond
FERC’s jurisdiction. This conclusion rests on a statutory interpretation of
the Bankruptcy Code. The Code provides that a bankruptcy estate trustee
(a debtor-in-possession) may, subject to the court’s approval, “assume or
reject any executory contract.” Federal courts have explained that this
provision “enable[s] ‘the trustee to maximize the value of the debtor’s estate
by assuming executory contracts . . . that benefit the estate and rejecting
those that do not.’” The rejection gives the non-breaching party a damages
claim against the bankruptcy estate but does not terminate the parties’
rights under the contract.
The rejection-as-breach determination is supported by two bankruptcy
law principles. First, the bankruptcy estate cannot possess any more rights
111

112

113
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115
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In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 519.
In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 520 (emphasis added).
111
Id. at 525 (stating that “FERC can only approve a change to a filed rate ‘if the rate is so low
110

as to adversely affect interest’” and that the filed rate doctrine “does not allow FERC to
change a filed rate based upon the purely private concern that the rate ‘is unprofitable to the
public utility.’” (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 35 U.S. 348, 355
(1956))).
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In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 519 (“Under the Bankruptcy Code . . . Mirant’s rejection of the
Back-to-Back Agreement is a breach of contract.” (citing 11 U.S.C § 365(g))).
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11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2018). A contract is executory when “performance remains due to
some extent on both sides.” Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct.
1652, 1658 (2019) (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6 (1984)).
The Bankruptcy Code’s plain terms specify that the rejection of an executory contract
constitutes a breach of contract. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2018); see Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at
1658.
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Cinicola v. Scharffenberger, 248 F.3d 110, 119–20 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting L.R.S.C. Co.
v. Rickel Home Ctr., 209 F.3d 291, 298 (3d Cir. 2000)).
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See Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1658; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 236
cmt. a (1981).
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See Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1661 (“Rejection of a contract—any contract—in
bankruptcy operates not as a rescission but as a breach.”).
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than the debtor itself had outside of bankruptcy. Second, terms undefined
in the Bankruptcy Code retain the definitions that are established at
common law. In this instance, the term “breach of contract” in section
365(g), as incorporated by section 365(a), has a well-established meaning at
common law: “When performance of a duty under a contract is due any
non-performance is a breach.” In addition, under the common law, a total
breach occurs when the breach “discharges the injured party’s remaining
duties to render such performance.” Repudiation, similar to nonperformance, also is generally considered a total breach. A total breach
gives the non-breaching party a claim for damages. It also paves the way
for the non-breaching party to choose whether to continue to perform or to
refuse to perform further. Consistent with these provisions, Mirant
explained that the Bankruptcy Code “permit[s] a business to reorganize
instead of liquidating [thus] . . . allow[ing] it to ‘continue to provide jobs, to
satisfy creditors’ claims, and to produce a return for its owners.”
Mirant’s embrace of the Bankruptcy Code makes its statutory analysis
relatively straightforward. First, the Fifth Circuit recognized that rejection
under Bankruptcy Code section 365 constitutes a breach of contract that
transforms the non-breaching party into an unsecured creditor with a prepetition claim against the estate. The Fifth Circuit’s decision is supported
117
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Id. at 1663 (citing Bd. of Trade of Chic. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 14 (1924)); 11 U.S.C. §
541(a)).
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Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1662 (citing Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995)); see also,
e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992) (articulating the wellestablished principle that where Congress uses terms that have accumulated a settled
meaning under the common law, courts must infer that Congress intended to incorporate
that settled common law understanding).
119
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235.
120
Id. §§ 235, 243(1).
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See id. § 253.
122
See infra note 125.
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See Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1662 (citing 13 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 39:32 (4th ed. 2013) (footnote omitted)).
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In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511, 517 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Whiting Pools,
Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983)).
125
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2018) (“[T]he trustee, subject to the court’s approval, may assume or
reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.”); 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2018)
(“[T]he rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a
breach of such contract[.]”); see, e.g., Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1658; In re Murphy, 694
F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1982) (“[R]ejection of an executory contract in accordance with
applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Act is not the equivalent of rescission . . . .
[R]ejection constitutes a breach of contract, and a person injured thereby is deemed a
creditor and is entitled to assert a claim for damages.”); In re Lavigne, 114 F.3d 379, 386–87
(2d Cir. 1997) (“While rejection is treated as a breach, it does not completely terminate the
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by bankruptcy case law, which provides that parties are generally left with
the rights and remedies available outside of bankruptcy law following
rejection. To that end, federal courts elsewhere have explained, “rejection
operates as a breach of an existing and continuing legal obligation of the
debtor, not as a discharge or extinction of the obligation itself.”
Second, the Fifth Circuit concluded that FERC jurisdiction does not
extend to common law breach of contract claims arising from wholesale
power purchase contracts subject to FPA regulation. Indeed, FERC itself
has held that energy contract sales disputes “negotiated [at] market-based
rates are more appropriately resolved in court or by arbitration.”
State courts also have successfully asserted jurisdiction over FPA
related contracts. For example, in Airco Alloys Div., Airco, Inc. v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., a group of industrial customers alleged that Niagara
Mohawk breached its contract with the Power Authority of the State of New
York (Power Authority). The contract was mandated by an order pursuant
to the Federal Power Act that directed the Power Authority to make lowcost hydropower available to Niagara Mohawk. In return, Niagara
126
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130

131

contract.”); Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. N.H. Elec. Coop., Inc., 884 F.2d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 1989)
(The Code “afford[s] breathing space to decide which contracts [debtors] wish to assume [or
reject].”).
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Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are created and
defined by state law.”); see also Clean Burn Fuels, LLC v. Purdue BioEnergy, LLC, 492 B.R.
445, 457 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2013) (“When hearing a case under diversity jurisdiction, federal
courts apply the law of the forum state . . . . Thus, ‘in the absence of a compelling federal
interest which dictates otherwise, [state law applies] where a federal bankruptcy court seeks
to determine the extent of a debtor’s property interest.’”) (quoting In re Merritt Dredging
Co., 839 F.2d 2013, 206 (4th Cir. 1988)); Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Understanding “Rejection”, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 848, 863, 888 (1988)
(explaining that rejection excludes that property and those substantive rights from the
bankruptcy estate).
127
In re Modern Textile, Inc., 900 F.2d 1184, 1191 (8th Cir. 1990); see also In re Midwest
Polychem, Ltd., 61 B.R. 559, 563 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 9, 1986) (“Rejection of the contract
constitutes a breach and the injured party is entitled to assert a claim for damages.”); see also
In re Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 131 B.R. 808, 812 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (“[I]t is not true that
solvent debtors may petition for bankruptcy and then obtain a windfall by rejecting their
executory contracts . . . . Such a view ignores the fact that in the event of liquidation the party
whose contract is rejected must have his claim satisfied before the debtor may obtain
recovery.”) (quoting In re Chi-Feng Huang, 23 B.R. 798, 803 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
128
In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511, 521–22 (5th Cir. 2004).
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PPL Mont., LLC, 96 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,313, 62,208 (2001).
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Airco Alloys Div., Airco, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 65 A.D.2d 378, 381 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1978).
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Mohawk was required to sell this power to a class of industrial customers.
In response to a defense raised by Niagara Mohawk and the Power
Authority that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims, a New York
intermediate appellate court concluded that it retained jurisdiction because
“traditional common-law claims do not lose their character because it is
common knowledge that there exists a related, and perhaps relevant,
scheme of federal regulation.”
Likewise, in KN Energy, Inc. v. Great Western Sugar Co., Colorado
state courts resolved allegations that a natural gas supplier had breached a
FERC jurisdictional contract with a customer by unilaterally “changing the
standard under which it determined when to interrupt delivery.” There,
the Great Western Sugar Company ultimately was awarded damages arising
from the breach of the parties’ service agreement without involvement of
FERC, despite KN Energy’s argument that the change was mandated by
FERC.
Similarly, in Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that neither the Natural Gas Act nor the Natural Gas
Policy Act precluded a state court from deciding contractual issues involving
gas purchase contracts, which were regulated tangentially and peripherally
by federal statutes.
Finally, in Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., the Ohio
Court of Appeals cited FERC for the proposition that “[t]he Commission
has no special expertise in applying relevant contract law to divine the intent
of the contracting parties as to the degree of firmness contemplated in their
contract” for the purposes of contract interpretation. Cases like these likely
132
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135

136

137

132
133

Id. at 383.
Id. at 384 (citing Pan American Corp. v. Superior Court of Delaware, 366 U.S. 656, 663

(1961)). In addition, the New York court concluded that “[e]qually well established is the
principle that exclusive jurisdiction provisions do not divest the state courts of the power to
decide questions arising under the laws of the United States, but only ‘cases’ arising under
those laws.” Id. at 383–84 (citing Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259
(1897)).
134
698 P.2d 769, 775 (Colo. 1985).
135
Id. at 775, 781.
136
107 N.M. 679, 684 (1988).
137
684 N.E.2d 343, 349 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 74
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,192, 61,659 (1996)) (internal citation marks omitted)). See also Ne. Rural Elec.
Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, 56 N.E.3d 38, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
(holding that a claim for breach of contract for generation and transmission of electricity
accrued at time that cooperative submitted to jurisdiction of Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission); Pogo Producing Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co, 493 So. 2d 909 (La. Ct. App.),
writ denied, 497 So. 2d 310 (La. 1986) (granting a preliminary injunction in favor of producer
to enforce specific performance against pipeline arising out of six gas purchase contracts);
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allowed the Mirant court to conclude it was on firm ground when it
determined that both the Bankruptcy Code and FERC appear to funnel
traditional common law contract claims—like breach—to the courts.
The third and final step for the Fifth Circuit was to characterize
Mirant’s rejection as a traditional breach of contract that transformed the
other party, Pepco, into an unsecured creditor. To that end, the Fifth
Circuit’s conclusion, “Mirant may choose to reject this agreement as
unnecessary to its reorganized business because it represents excess capacity
in its system to supply electricity” reasonably follows from this Bankruptcy
Code interpretation.
138

B.

Mirant is Unpersuasive

Ultimately, Mirant’s arguments should be unpersuasive to other
courts. Mirant appears to rest on a filed rate doctrine misreading and an
expansive view of the Bankruptcy Code that eliminates any possibility for
continuing FERC jurisdiction over wholesale power purchase contracts.
Both of these issues are addressed below.

1.

Mirant Drew Improper Distinctions Between the Contract

Terms
Mirant relied, in part, on a distinction between the “rate” in a
traditional sense and the other contractual terms. This distinction appears
impermissible in light of a trio of Supreme Court cases suggesting that the
filed rate requires courts to consider all of the contract provisions instead of
the interplay between the price and quantity terms.
First, Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas Corp. Commission
considered whether the Kansas State Corporation Commission could
require an interstate pipeline company to purchase gas from all wells
connecting with its pipeline system without encroaching upon the exclusive
139

RJB Gas Pipeline Co. v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 813 P.2d 1, 5–6 (Okla. Civ. App. 1989)
(holding that there was no usurpation of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s
jurisdiction when a state court resolved a natural gas seller’s claim against the buyer for
amounts allegedly due under the contract for the sale of interstate gas); Doswell Ltd. P’ship
v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 468 S.E.2d 84 (Va. 1996) (exercising jurisdiction in an action
brought by independent power producer against electric utility for breach of power purchase
agreement).
138
In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2004).
139
Id. at 515 (“While the FPA does not preempt breach of contract claims that challenge a
filed rate, district courts are permitted to grant relief in situations where the breach of contract
claim is based upon another rationale.”).
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regulatory jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission. There, the
Court held that the filed rate doctrine applied even though “the orders do
not deal in terms of prices or volumes of purchases[.]” The Court
explained that the Natural Gas Act leaves no room for direct or indirect
regulation of interstate wholesale contracts because it “directly affect[s] the
ability of the Federal Power Commission to regulate comprehensively and
effectively the transportation and sale of natural gas, and to achieve the
uniformity of regulation.”
Second, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall evaluated whether the
filed rate doctrine barred a state court from calculating damages in a breachof-contract action based on an assumption that FERC would have approved
a different rate had it known about material facts that were withheld. The
basic issue was a contract provision that required the Arkansas Louisiana
Gas Company to pay the same rate for gas from the Sligo Gas Field as it was
paying a different supplier. Eventually, the respondents—natural gas
producers—discovered they were being paid less than the other supplier and
sought contract damages in Louisiana state court based on the clause. The
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the damages award. However, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed that decision, concluding, “[i]t would undermine
the congressional scheme of uniform rate regulation to allow a state court to
award as damages a rate never filed with the Commission” even when the
provision entitling that party to damages was included in the previously
approved contract. The Court’s decision was buttressed by the filed rate
doctrine’s fundamental purpose of “granting the Commission an
opportunity in every case to judge the reasonableness of the rate.”
Third, AT&T v. Central Office Telephone explained that “[r]ates . . .
do not exist in isolation.” Instead, “[t]hey have meaning only when one
knows the services to which they are attached.”
The upshot of these cases is that FERC is obligated to exercise
oversight over changes to jurisdictional contracts because of its comparative
competence, the desire for uniform decision making, and the regulatory
obligation created by the filed rate. For the contracts themselves, these cases
suggest that FERC jurisdictional contracts should be treated holistically and
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that attempts to isolate price and quantity terms are likely inconsistent with
the filed rate doctrine and the FPA. Indeed, even the Arkansas Louisiana
Gas Co. attempt to award damages for failing to comply with a FERC
approved equal payment contract provision was deemed a violation.
Accordingly, FERC unsuccessfully argued in Mirant:
FERC’s reasonableness calculus [under 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)]
included a factor that the parties would honor all their obligations
throughout the duration of the applicable contractual term.
Mirant’s proposed rejection would remove that factor from the
calculus. Without FERC review and approval, Mirant would be
able to retain . . . [those] benefits . . . without the corresponding . .
. obligations[.]
FERC found a more sympathetic court for this argument two years
later. In In re Calpine, a debtor “filed a motion in the Bankruptcy Court for
entry of an order authorizing debtors to reject certain energy contracts”
because the “electricity prices fixed in the [power agreements] are
significantly lower than prevailing electricity prices.” For its part, the district
court recognized “FERC’s jurisdiction and the filed rate doctrine stretches
past regulation of rates . . . and extends to the terms and conditions of
wholesale energy contracts.” Moreover, “[a] change to the duration of a
filed rate energy contract, would also come under FERC’s jurisdiction.”
Thus, the court explained:
149
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Central Office Telephone is a case adjudicating an issue under the Telecommunications
Act. Nevertheless, filed rate doctrine analysis remains similar under the acts governing FCC
and FERC jurisdiction. See id. at 221–22; Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467,
477–89 (2002) (tracing the history of tariffs and the filed rate doctrines back to the Interstate
Commerce Commission).
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Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 579.
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Br. of Appellee FERC at 36, In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Federal
Power Act, § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012) (requiring “[a]ll rates and charges made,
demanded, or received . . . in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . be just and reasonable.”).
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337 B.R. 27, 30–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
153
Id. at 32.
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Id. at 33 (citing In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 822 (1968) (“The
regulatory system created by the Act is premised on contractual agreements voluntarily
devised by the regulated companies; it contemplates abrogation of these agreements only in
circumstances of unequivocal public necessity.”)); see Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v.
Fed. Power Comm’n, 343 U.S. 414, 423 (1952) (holding that if an energy supplier “wishes
to discontinue some or all of the services [the FPA] has rendered for the past twenty years,
the Act . . . opens up a way provided [the supplier] can prove that its wishes are consistent
with the public interest.”).
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The [a]greements that Calpine seeks to reject have been filed with
FERC and, under normal conditions, altering the rates, terms,
conditions, or duration of the contracts would require FERC
involvement and approval. A solvent company could not choose
to stop performance and expect anything other than swift FERC
action. There are no provisions in the FPA that specifically limit
FERC jurisdiction in the bankruptcy context.
Finally, the district court explained the Code’s structure itself allows a
regulatory agency to exercise its authority during “the pendency of a
reorganization.”
Notably, unlike in Mirant, the Calpine court chose to avoid wading too
deeply into the “rejection as a breach” versus “rejection as a modification
subject to FERC approval” issue on which the Mirant decision ultimately
turned. Instead, the court characterized the rejection as a “unilateral
termination” subject to FERC jurisdiction. In this way, the Calpine court
allowed the filed rate doctrine to extend fully into the bankruptcy context.
First, Calpine recognized, unlike the Mirant court, that the filed rate means
the entire contract including the regulatory obligation created by FERC
approval of the original commercial agreement. Second, Calpine reasoned
that Congress intended for the Bankruptcy Code to accommodate actions
by regulatory agencies pursuant to section 1129(a)(6).
Similarly, In re Boston Generating considered FERC jurisdiction’s
effect on the bankruptcy court. In that case, the debtor sought to reject a
contract for natural gas transportation via a third-party pipeline to one of its
power plants. Separately, the debtor sought FERC approval to sell the
power plant as part of its bankruptcy reorganization. At issue was not
whether FERC had jurisdiction, but the order in which the FERC and the
bankruptcy court could exercise it. Both parties agreed, “FERC must make
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1129(a)(6)).
157
Id. at 36 (“Because there is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code that limits FERC’s jurisdiction,
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nor any other federally regulated energy company in the country could do without seeking
FERC approval: cease performance under the rates, terms, and conditions of filed rate
wholesale energy contracts in the hopes of getting a better deal.”).
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No. 10 Civ. 6528 DLC, 2010 WL 4616243 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2010).
Id. at *1.
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Id. at *2.
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the public interest determination” before the contract could be rejected.
In its decision, the district court acknowledged that under the filed rate
doctrine, “[o]nce filed with FERC, wholesale power contracts become the
‘equivalent of a federal regulation.’” The district court reasoned,
“[w]hether the bankruptcy court and FERC review the proposed rejection
concurrently or serially is of no consequence. If either the bankruptcy court
or FERC does not approve the Debtors’ rejection of the [pipeline service
agreement], the Debtors may not reject the contract.” Calpine and Boston
Generating, thus, demonstrate that the filed rate doctrine can accommodate
both FERC and bankruptcy jurisdiction.
162

163

164

2.

Rejection Marks a “Radical Departure” from Traditional
Contract Law

In addition to misreading the filed rate doctrine, the Fifth Circuit relied
on an expansive “rejection as a breach” argument to support its conclusion
that Mirant could reject undesirable contracts without FERC review. This
position is made untenable by bankruptcy’s “radical departure” from
traditional contract law. Rejection encompasses powers that are not
coextensive with common law contracts. Professor Michael T. Andrew, in
his leading article on the subject, explains:
Courts describe the “power” to reject as permitting such things as
the release, repeal, reconsideration, discharge, revocation,
repudiation, alteration, voiding, cancellation or avoidance of
contract or lease obligations . . . . Courts frequently use the vehicle
of rejection to terminate rights in or to property that are otherwise
good in bankruptcy. All of this suggests a radical departure from
normal contract law.
Rejection flows from the fact that the debtor and the bankruptcy estate
are distinct legal entities. This difference plays a role in determining which
165
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See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding “Rejection”,
59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 847–48 (1988).
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Andrew, supra note 166, at 847–48.
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Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506, 512 (2012) (differentiating between the debtor and
the estate when determining the dischargeability of certain taxes); Andrew, supra note 166,
at 851–52.
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party is liable for the breach. Unlike a traditional contract obligor, the
bankruptcy estate is not bound under the contract unless the trustee elects
to assume it. Because the debtor and the estate are two separate entities,
bankruptcy differentiates between the debtor’s obligations and the estate’s
obligations. As a general rule, claims that arise pre-petition are the debtor’s
obligations, while claims that arise post-petition belong to the estate. Since
the rejection of the contract in bankruptcy is based on the legal fiction that
the contract is considered rejected at the time the debtor files bankruptcy,
rejection creates a pre-petition obligation of the debtor, not a post-petition
obligation of the estate. In the event that the bankruptcy trustee does not
assume the contract, the non-breaching party does not obtain a claim against
the bankruptcy estate, but rather an unsecured claim against the debtor.
This distinction is not an academic curiosity. The differing obligations of
the debtor and estate create different rights and remedies based on those
different claims, which have real world consequences for creditors.
Unlike in a traditional contract breach, equitable relief is only allowed
when “such breach gives rise to a right to payment.” In other words,
specific performance is not an available remedy in bankruptcy, despite
being an option in a garden-variety breach of contract action. To that end,
169
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See 11 U.S.C. § 507; Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652,
1658 (2019) (citing NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531–32 (1984); cf. In re
Res. Tech. Corp., 662 F.3d 472, 476 (7th Cir. 2011). The practical implication is that the
non-breaching party will struggle to recover more than a few cents on every dollar when
attempting to recover from a bankrupt debtor stripped of his or her assets which are now
held separately in the bankruptcy estate. See Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1658 (citation
omitted).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (describing the priority of claims and expenses against the
bankruptcy estate); Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1658 (citation omitted).
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11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B) (2018); see, e.g., In re Nickels Midway Pier, LLC, 255 Fed. Appx.
633, 637–38 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Ben Franklin Hotel Assocs., 186 F.3d 301, 305–
06 (3d Cir. 1999)), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 812 (2008).
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As mentioned, the provisions of the bankruptcy code allow equitable claims that give rise
to a right of repayment. The bankruptcy discharge and plan confirmation provisions provide,
respectively, for an injunction precluding the filing of any action on a claim that has been
discharged and acting as res judicata on any claim that could have been brought. See, e.g., In
re Ben Franklin Hotel Assocs., 186 F.3d 301, 304 (3d Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, when an
equitable claim does not give rise to a right of repayment as a viable alternative, then some
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the Calpine court recognized, “[i]t is of no moment that rejection in the
bankruptcy court constitutes a breach . . . . [A] ‘breach’ here does not create
a typical dispute over the terms of a contract, but the unilateral termination
of a regulatory obligation.”
During the 2018–2019 term, the Supreme Court shed new light on
bankruptcy rejection. Mission Product Holdings Inc. v. Tempnology
considered whether contract rejection during a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding results in a breach of contract or has “the effect of a contract
rescission in the non-bankruptcy world.” The Court held that rejection
results in a breach of contract that provides the aggrieved, non-breaching
party a pre-petition claim for damages. Although Mission Product
Holdings adopted the rejection-as-a-breach framework, the Court explained
that “[t]he Code of course aims to make reorganizations possible. But it
does not permit anything and everything that might advance that goal.” To
that end, Mission Product Holdings provides that rejection “does not grant
the debtor an exemption from all the burdens that generally applicable law
. . . imposes on private owners.” Instead, “Whatever ‘limitation[s] on the
debtor’s property [apply] outside of bankruptcy[] appl[y] inside of
bankruptcy as well. A debtor’s property does not shrink by happenstance of
bankruptcy, but it does not expand, either.’”
Elsewhere, executory contracts similarly have been described “as an
asset coupled with a liability—the asset being the performance due the
debtor and the liability being the obligation owed by the debtor.” Professor
Andrew has written, “The debtor’s obligations are unaffected, and provide
177
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(6th ed. 2014)). See also Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 11 (1924) (holding that a
validly transferred property interest prior to the bankruptcy enters the bankruptcy estate
subject to that interest).
183
Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 99 (1992) (citing DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H.
JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 234 (2d ed. 1990)).
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the basis for a claim.” Courts have construed the term “obligation”
broadly—consistent with its common meaning—as “[t]hat which a person is
bound to do or forebear; any duty imposed by law, promise, contract,
relations of society, courtesy, kindness, etc.” These explanations suggest
that limitations on a debtor, such as the counterparty’s license or lease of
the debtor’s property, persist following a rejection.
In the FERC context, wholesale power purchase contracts are
authorized and subject to ongoing regulatory oversight. FERC’s continuing
jurisdiction over these contracts amounts to a limitation on the parties’ rights
to freely assign or modify their agreement. The failure of courts, such as in
Mirant, to distinguish between the parties’ commercial transaction and the
ongoing regulatory obligation created by FERC’s approval of that
transaction has at least two problems. First, the filed rate doctrine
commands that the regulatory obligation arising from the filed rate is
separate and superior to any private contractual duty. To that end, any
regulatory obligation owed to FERC is independent of the executory
contract and, thus, is beyond the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. Second,
even if the regulatory obligation was not separate from the underlying
commercial transaction, allowing debtors to reject their regulatory
obligations during bankruptcy would impermissibly expand their rights by
providing a benefit that would not be available outside of bankruptcy;
namely, the option to jettison an otherwise valid and ongoing duty. In this
way, disposal of a regulatory obligation incident to executory contract
rejection is both inconsistent with FERC’s jurisdiction and the fact that “‘[a]
debtor’s property . . . does not expand’” during bankruptcy. Though, to
be clear, the regulatory obligation’s independent nature is sufficient to
resolve this issue in light of FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction, as discussed
immediately below.
184

185

186

187

188

189

184

Andrew, supra note 166, at 931; see also In re Lavigne, 114 F.3d 379, 386–87 (2nd Cir.
1997) (“While rejection is treated as a breach, it does not completely terminate the contract
. . . . Thus, ‘[r]ejection merely frees the estate from the obligation to perform; it does not
make the contract disappear.’”) (quoting In re The Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, 138
B.R. 687, 703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
185
In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 268 F.3d 205, 209 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 968–69 (5th ed. 1979)).
186
See supra notes 73 – 76.
187
In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
188
Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1663 (quoting D. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY, 97
(6th ed. 2014)).
189
Infra Part V.
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V. FERC’S EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
This section explains why jurisdictional disputes between FERC and
bankruptcy courts should be resolved by affirming FERC’s exclusive
authority under the FPA over filed rates. It further explains why the
Supreme Court’s frequently cited Bildisco and NextWave holdings provide
limited guidance. This section finally argues that Congress should consider
enacting a legislative solution to the extent that courts do not allow FERC to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale power purchase contracts in
the bankruptcy context.
190

A. Exclusive Jurisdiction
1.

The Federal Power Act Demands Exclusive Jurisdiction

FERC’s own view of its jurisdiction relative to the bankruptcy courts
has evolved. The Commission first took the position that it had exclusive
jurisdiction over wholesale power purchase contracts. After Mirant, FERC
concluded that the Fifth Circuit’s holding was the applicable standard for
the Calpine case. Following the decisions in Calpine and Boston
Generating, FERC initially took the position that it had concurrent
jurisdiction over PG&E’s bankruptcy. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit,
FERC came full circle by asserting that it retains exclusive regulatory
jurisdiction over filed contracts.
The PG&E bankruptcy court expressed vehement opposition to
FERC’s concurrent jurisdiction approach. The court concluded that it
would be unfair and vitiate the bankrupt party’s rights:
Parties not in bankruptcy are subjected to an involuntary process
by their opponents before a non-judicial, administrative body. Just
a few days later they are told by that body that if they file
bankruptcy, one of the basic and critically important tools . . . will
be unavailable. And if they don’t like it, they’ll have to appeal via
191

192

193

194

195

190

FCC v. NextWave, 537 U.S. 293 (2003); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513
(1984).
191
Br. of Appellee FERC at 8–11, In re Mirant, (No. 04-10001), 2004 WL 2682161.
192
In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. at 31.
193
NextEra Energy, Inc. v. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., 167 FERC ¶ 61,096 (2019) (Nos. EL1935-001, EL19-36-001), 2019 WL 2026800, at *1.
194
Br. for Appellant FERC at 38, In re PG&E Corp., Nos. 19-16833, 19-16834 (9th Cir. Nov.
20, 2019) (“The Federal Power Act gives the Commission exclusive authority to regulate the
sale of [electric] energy at wholesale in interstate commerce[.]” (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(a),
824d(a))).
195
NextEra Energy, Inc., 2019 WL 2026800, at *4.
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a procedure outside of the bankruptcy system with its exclusive
subject-matter jurisdiction.
One day later they file bankruptcy, where myriad rights and duties (and
obligations) come into play and a bankruptcy court, experienced in
bankruptcy matters, is there to preside. Now that bankruptcy is a reality and
not an intention, the agency repeats its prior ruling, that it has concurrent
jurisdiction with the bankruptcy court, but that court will not be available to
vindicate one of their fundamental and critical bankruptcy rights.
Although the bankruptcy court appropriately recognized the
“absurdity” of this process, the court erred in its conclusion that the
bankruptcy court retains exclusive jurisdiction. To the contrary, FERC
should exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the parties’ wholesale power
purchase contracts because the filed rate creates an ongoing regulatory
obligation for the debtor governed by the FPA.
Although the contract and regulatory obligation tend to operate
coterminously, once a contract is approved by FERC, the parties’
obligations emanate from the rate filed with FERC, not their underlying
commercial transaction.198 These filed rates carry the force and effect of
law. Upon approval, they become the “equivalent of a federal regulation,”
and the duty to perform under those contracts arises, “not from the law of
private contracts,” but FERC itself. In addition to creating the parties’
obligations, the doctrine creates “an independent regulatory duty [for
196

197

199

200

201

196

In re PG&E Corp., 603 B.R. 471, 484–85 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019).
Id. at 484.
198
See Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 343 U.S. 414, 422 (1952);
In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); cf. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37,
197

78 n.4 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“If you think you can think about a thing that is hitched
to other things without thinking about the things that it is hitched to, then you have a legal
mind.” (quotation mark omitted)).
199
See infra note 233; see also Nw. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 181 F.2d
19, 22 (8th Cir. 1950) (Filed rates are “treated as though it were a statute, binding upon the
seller and the purchaser alike.” (citations omitted)); cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281, 295 (1979) (“It has been established in a variety of contexts that properly promulgated,
substantive agency regulations have the ‘force and effect of law.’” (footnote omitted)).
200
California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Cahnmann v. Sprint Corp., 133 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 1998)).
201
Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 343 U.S. at 422; see also Blumenthal v. NRG Power
Mktg., Inc., 104 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,211, 61,743 (2003) (“[T]he commission exercised . . . its
authority under the FPA, which is independent of authority arising from the contract.”); cf.
Noble Energy, Inc. v. Jewell, 110 F.Supp.3d 5 (D.D.C. 2015) (concluding that discharging a
party’s contractual obligations did not also free them from obligations arising from an
overlapping regulation), aff’d, 650 Fed.Appx. 9 (2016).
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FERC] to remedy a utility’s violation of its filed rate schedule.” As a result,
FERC has plenary jurisdiction over the filed rates, meaning the entire
agreement, not just the per-unit cost of electricity.
Considering FERC’s expansive authority, the concurrent jurisdiction
argument, as the PG&E bankruptcy court identified, leads to inefficient
results. Even if the debtor first obtains bankruptcy court approval to reject
the wholesale contract, the debtor must still obtain FERC approval to
modify the filed rate because the filed rate ultimately controls the debtor’s
regulatory obligations.203 On the other hand, if the debtor first obtains FERC
approval for the desired modification or cancellation, then the need to
obtain bankruptcy court approval for a rejection of the contract is obviated.
Finally, if FERC enforces the existing rate, then the bankruptcy court still
cannot approve a contract rejection because the controlling filed rate
remains the law that the parties must follow.205
As a policy matter, FERC should retain exclusive jurisdiction over the
wholesale energy market. In other contexts, neither state nor privatelyenforced laws can interfere with FERC’s ability to set and control
wholesale energy rates. FERC’s exclusivity allows regulated entities to order
their affairs around it, which may reduce marketplace uncertainty.
Allowing a regulated entity to reject a wholesale power purchase contract in
bankruptcy court could upset this delicate balance. Finally, FERC is better202

204

206

207

208

202

Duke Power Co. v. FERC, 864 F.2d 823, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he enforcement of
filed rate schedules is a matter distinctly within the Commission’s statutory mandate[.]”)
203
See Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 343 U.S. at 422; In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. at
37.
204
16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (2018) (“Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no change shall
be made by any public utility in any such rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any rule,
regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after sixty days’ notice to the Commission and
to the public.”); 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018) (granting FERC authority to revise contracts
“[w]henever the Commission . . . [finds] that any rate . . . or contract affecting such rate . . .
is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential[.]”).
205
See Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 343 U.S. at 422; In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27,
37 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
206
See, e.g., FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016) (“We will not
read the FPA, against its clear terms, to halt a practice that so evidently enables the
Commission to fulfill its statutory duties of holding down prices and enhancing reliability in
the wholesale energy market.”).
207
See generally Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power in Power Markets: The Filed-Rate
Doctrine and Competition in Electricity, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM, 921, 923 (2013)
(“Several circuits have invoked the filed-rate doctrine . . . to immunize power generators from
private suits under the Sherman Act.”).
208
NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, 174 (2010)
(“Competitive power markets simply cannot attract the capital needed to build adequate
generating infrastructure without regulatory certainty.”).
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suited with its agency expertise to understand whether “extraordinary
circumstances” exist that justify modification or cancellation of a filed tariff
under FPA section 206. For these reasons, the logical and efficient solution
is to require the parties to seek a modification (i.e., termination) of the tariff
through a petition to FERC.210
209

2. Bankruptcy Code Section 1129(a)(6) Accommodates FERC
As a textual matter, the Bankruptcy Code expressly contemplates the
interplay between bankruptcy courts and administrative agencies. Section
1129(a)(6) accounts for governmental regulatory commissions like FERC
with rate oversight: “Any governmental regulatory commission with
jurisdiction, after confirmation of the plan, over the rates of the debtor has
approved any rate change provided for in the plan, or such rate change is
expressly conditioned on such approval.” Unfortunately, Congress
appears to have provided little insight into the meaning of “rate” in section
1129(a)(6). The relevant legislative history simply, and somewhat selfevidently, explains that the section “permits confirmation only if any
regulatory commission that will have jurisdiction over the debtor after
confirmation of the plan has approved any rate change provided for in the
plan. As an alternative, the rate change may be conditioned on such
approval.”
Statutory interpretation principles are more instructive. As a general
matter, statutes should be read harmoniously such that competing texts are
made compatible. Moreover, “where Congress borrows terms of art . . .
which are accumulated [in] the legal tradition . . . it presumably knows and
211

212

213

209

16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018) (directing the Commission to “determine the just and
reasonable rate . . . and shall fix the same by order.”).
210
See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (2018) (“Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no change
shall be made by any public utility in any such rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any
rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after sixty days’ notice to the Commission
and to the public.”); 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018) (granting FERC authority to revise contracts
“[w]henever the Commission . . . [finds] that any rate . . . or contract affecting such rate . . .
is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential[.]”).
211
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(6) (2018). In addition, bankruptcy courts cannot use the automatic
stay to enjoin agency enforcement proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2018); Bd. of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 39–40 (1991).
212
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 412 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6368; S. REP.
NO. 95-989, at 126 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5912 (using identical
language as the House Report).
213
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 58 (1868)
(“[O]ne part is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction the two
can be made to stand together.”).

36

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1

adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word.”
Finally, “when ‘judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an
existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute’
is presumed to incorporate that interpretation.” Although not dispositive,
these canons suggest that to the extent the filed rate doctrine was part of the
legal landscape at the time section 1129(a)(6) was enacted and it promotes
harmony between the Federal Power Act and the Bankruptcy Code, it is
reasonable to interpret section 1129(a)(6)’s “rate” term as co-extensive with
the filed rate doctrine.
Several factors suggest Congress anticipated, or reasonably should have
anticipated, that FERC’s broad authority arising from the FPA and filed rate
doctrine would be imputed into section 1129(a)(6). First, the filed rate
doctrine is widely applied by administrative agencies in the context of
pervasively regulated industries such as electric and gas utilities, railroads,
and telecommunications. This history should support a finding that the
doctrine is part of “the accumulated legal tradition.” Likewise, the
doctrine’s long history supports an inference that Congress borrowed, or
expected courts to borrow, its definition of “rate” in the regulatory context.
Second, Congress was likely aware of the interplay between the doctrine and
the rejection of executory contracts during bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy
Code has allowed the rejection of executory contracts that are “onerous” or
“burdensome” to the estate of the debtor since the 1890s. Third, by its
very terms, section 1129(a)(6) assumes that a “regulatory commission” with
rate regulatory authority will be involved in the reorganization process by
exercising its normal authority. Since section 1129(a)(6) expressly grants
authority to regulatory agencies, it suggests that Congress was aware that
regulatory agencies would be involved in the reorganization process. It also
214

215

216

217

218

214

See, e.g., Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 53 (2012).
215
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1386 (2015) (quoting
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998)).
216
See supra note 149.
217
Supra Section III.A.; see also Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 260 U.S.
156, 163 (1922) (“The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to a rate are
measured by the published tariff . . . . The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or
enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.”).
218
In re Midwest Polychem, Ltd., 61 B.R. 559, 562 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986). Though, it is
possible Congress did not anticipate that utility bankruptcies would become more common.
Indraneel Sur, Jealous Guardians In The Psychedelic Kingdom: Federal Regulation of
Electricity Contracts In Bankruptcy, 152 PENN. L. REV. 1697, 1718 (2004) (“Given that utility
bankruptcies in significant numbers are only a product of the last decade, it may be that when
enacting the FPA, Congress did not anticipate the peculiar executory contract rejection that
would apply.”).
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suggests Congress intended regulatory agencies to apply their respective
bodies of law and did not want bankruptcy courts unilaterally supplanting
agency authority.
Finally, other statutory interpretation principles may further support
distinguishing between regulatory obligations arising from FERC
jurisdictional contracts and the remainder of the bankruptcy estate.
“Indeed, ‘when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the
courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to
regard each as effective.’” In addition to allowing both the FPA and the
Bankruptcy Code to coexist, this division of labor—leaving wholesale power
purchase contracts to FERC and everything else to the bankruptcy court—
may be more consistent with Congress’ intentions when it established a
specialized commission for interstate energy contracts and specialized
courts to address bankruptcy cases.
219

B.

NextWave and Bildisco

An additional consideration is the effect of several Supreme Court
bankruptcy cases cited by courts in decisions resolving conflicts between
FERC and the bankruptcy courts. For reasons discussed in detail below—
relating primarily to differences in the jurisdictional grants of authority given
to each agency—these cases provide only limited guidance in the wholesale
energy market context.
In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, a building supply company, Bildisco,
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. As part of its reorganization, Bildisco
rejected the collective-bargaining agreement with its employees. The union
representing the employees protested with the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB). The NLRB concluded that Bildisco had violated the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by unilaterally changing the
collective-bargaining agreement terms and by refusing to negotiate with the
union. The Court held, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 365(a), that
Bildisco could reject the union contract. It reasoned, “Congress knew how
to draft an exclusion for collective-bargaining agreements when it wanted
to.” Thus, in the absence of any such exception, the company could reject,
like any other contract, the bargaining agreement.
220

221

222

223

219

J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143–44 (2001)
(quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
220
465 U.S. 513, 517 (1984).
221
Id. at 518.
222
Id. at 518–19.
223
Id. at 522–23.
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Later in FCC v. NextWave, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) auctioned off certain broadband communications licenses to
NextWave Personal Communications (NextWave). “NextWave made a
downpayment on the purchase price, signed promissory notes for the
balance, and executed security agreements that the FCC perfected by filing
under the Uniform Commercial Code.” NextWave was unable to obtain
financing and missed its first payment deadline. The FCC, in turn, canceled
the contract and made NextWave’s licenses available for auction. The
Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the FCC could simply cancel
contracts with auction winners that went bankrupt instead of exercising its
rights under the contract. The Court explained, the FCC’s desire to “(1)
sell[] licenses on credit and (2) cancel[] licenses rather than assert[] security
interests in licenses when there is a default” amounts “to nothing more than
a policy preference.” Although the FCC had a “regulatory motive,” it
ultimately was acting as an unsecured creditor—not a third-party regulator.
The Court concluded that the FCC was bound by the terms of its contract
and could not attempt to avoid the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over
NextWave’s bankruptcy estate.
Although Bildisco and NextWave both addressed disputes between
bankruptcy courts and federal agencies, there is a crucial difference between
the agencies implicated in those cases and FERC. The NLRB and FCC do
not approve contracts carrying the force of law. The NLRA provides the
NLRB authority to regulate labor contract disputes affecting interstate
commerce. The NLRB neither approves the contracts themselves nor
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over all employers, employees, or labor
disputes. To that end, the Calpine court reasoned, the NLRB “does not
possess exclusive jurisdiction over the terms of collective bargaining
agreements, thus, in Bildisco, there was no jurisdictional conflict.” The
224

225

226

227

228

229

230

231

224

537 U.S. 293 (2003).
Id. at 296–97.
226
Id. at 301 (“The FCC has not denied that the proximate cause for its cancellation of the
licenses was NextWave’s failure to make the payments that were due. It contends, however,
that § 525 does not apply because the FCC had a ‘valid regulatory motive’ for the
cancellation.”).
227
Id. at 304.
228
Id. at 307
229
See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2017) (declaring a policy of
encouraging and protecting the free flow of commerce).
230
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2017) (defining employee rights protected under the NLRA); 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (2017) (establishing violations of the NLRA); 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (2017) (providing the
NLRA’s definition of “affecting commerce”); 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2017) (providing NLRB
authority to investigate and resolve questions about union representation).
231
In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
225
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Supreme Court has further explained, “The [NLRB’s authority] to deal with
an unfair labor practice . . . is not exclusive and does not destroy the
jurisdiction of the courts.” Likewise, Textile Workers Union of America
v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama concluded that the NLRA merely created a
new area of substantive federal law for the courts to interpret. In this way,
neither the NLRB nor the NLRA purports to exercise exclusive control
over labor agreements. Likewise, the FCC does not approve spectrum
contracts; it is a party to them by entering into agreements with spectrum
auction winners. To that end, the FCC’s failure to exercise its contractual
rights was the basis of the Court’s NextWave decision. Though the Court
discussed bankruptcy jurisdiction exceptions, NextWave ultimately stands
for the proposition that a government agency has no more rights as a
creditor than a private party.
Unlike the NLRB and the FCC, FERC aims to exercise plenary and
exclusive authority over wholesale power purchase contracts. Courts,
including the Supreme Court, have held, “[o]nce filed with a federal agency,
such tariffs are the ‘equivalent of a federal regulation.’” In 2016, Hughes
v. Talen Marketing affirmed FERC’s “plenary authority over interstate
wholesale rates.” Hughes involved a state’s decision to construct a new
232

233

234

235

236

232

Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962).
353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (“We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under §
301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor
laws.”); accord Cynthia A. Bailey, A Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under § 301(a) of
233

the Labor Management Relations Act: Wooddell v. International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, 34 B.C. L. REV. 343, 343–44 (1993) (“In the years following its enactment, the
United States Supreme Court decided that § 301(a) created a new area of federal substantive
law.”).
234
NextWave, 537 U.S. at 307 (“It is neither clear that a private party can take and enforce a
security interest in an FCC license, nor that the FCC cannot . . . . As we described in our
statement of facts, the FCC purported to take such a security interest in the present cases.
What is at issue, however, is not the enforcement of that interest in the bankruptcy process,
but rather elimination of the licenses through the regulatory step of ‘revoking’ them . . . .”)
(internal citations omitted).
235
Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Cahnmann
v. Sprint Corp., 133 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 1998); see Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d
837, 840 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also Lowden v. Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co.,
306 U.S. 516, 520–21 (1939) (holding “tariffs bind both carriers and shippers with the force
of law. Under § 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act the carrier cannot deviate from the rate
specified in the tariff for any service in connection with the transportation of property.”).
236
136 S. Ct. 1288, 1298 (2016). In Hughes, electricity regulators in Maryland were
concerned about sufficient electric generation capacity, and further that the market price
generated at the RTO capacity auctions would not spur the necessary development. Id. at
1294. In response, Maryland directly solicited bids for a new gas-fired power plant that would
not be part of the RTO market. Id. Maryland then promulgated a state regulation that would
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power plant, which is notable because such decisions traditionally belong to
states and are beyond FERC’s purview. Yet, the Supreme Court concluded
FERC had jurisdiction because the law would have resulted in indirect
subsidization by interstate market participants. In these ways, courts have
read FPA section 824(b)(1), which grants FERC exclusive jurisdiction over
“the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,” more
broadly than the NLRA or the Communications Act of 1934. Thus, in
contrast to NLRB and FCC cases, Calpine concluded:
There are no provisions in the FPA that specifically limit FERC
jurisdiction in the bankruptcy context. Quite the contrary, FERC,
in its charge to maintain reasonable rates and uphold the public
interest, must also consider the financial ability of a utility to
continue service under a filed rate, a responsibility that would
include similar considerations to those in the bankruptcy court.
In light of the differences between the FPA and other federal
regulatory statutes, the reliance of the Mirant court—and more recently, the
PG&E bankruptcy court—on the NextWave and Bildisco decisions is
misplaced.
237

238

C.

A Congressional Fix

Finally, if courts fail to find that FERC may exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over wholesale power purchase contracts in the bankruptcy
context, Congress should consider enacting a legislative solution to ensure
FERC’s authority over the regulatory obligation created by the filed rate. In
2005, Congress enacted reforms to clarify FERC’s role in regulating energy
derivatives following a dispute between FERC and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC). In that instance, Congress “expanded
FERC’s jurisdiction to include jurisdiction over manipulation in connection
with the purchase or sale of electric energy or transmission services and the
239

require other producers participating in the RTO market to buy electricity from the new
power plant and pay the new power plant the difference between the capacity auction price
and the new plant’s set contract price. Id. at 1294–95.
237
Id. at 1294.
238
In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra
Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956).
239
Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824v(a) (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for any entity
. . . to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of electric energy . . . subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance .
. . in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of electric ratepayers.”).
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purchase or sale of natural gas or transportation services.” The CFTC, in
turn, retained jurisdiction over energy derivatives. Likewise, following
Bildisco, Congress enacted legislation “to clarify the relationship between
the debtor in possession and its unionized employees.”
Although the Federal Power Act and existing case law should provide
a sufficient basis for exclusive FERC jurisdiction, Congress could act to
revise or expand sections 1113 through 1116 of the Bankruptcy Code to
account for wholesale power purchase contracts in addition to existing
accommodations for collective bargaining agreements, retiree insurance
benefits, estate property, and small businesses. Alternatively, or in
conjunction with Bankruptcy Code reforms, Congress could revise FPA
section 201 to affirm FERC’s primacy over these agreements.
240

241

242

VI. CONCLUSION
Avoiding a “Kafkaesque” process to resolve jurisdictional disputes
between FERC and the bankruptcy courts is an important goal. The most
appropriate solution is to grant FERC exclusive authority over wholesale
power purchase contracts. This approach is supported by statute and case
law. The Federal Power Act, and the cases interpreting it, extend FERC’s
jurisdiction beyond the “Attleboro gap” and grant the agency more authority
over regulated entities than the NLRB and FCC in their respective realms.
Allowing a debtor to reject its FERC jurisdictional contract gives that party
the option to unilaterally do what it could not achieve in any other context:
alter the terms of a filed rate without FERC approval.
Moreover, the filed rate doctrine’s application in combination with a
bankruptcy proceeding contract rejection ultimately would be futile. Even if
the bankruptcy court allowed the rejection, the parties would still be subject
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to their FERC regulatory obligations because the filed rate is not a run-ofthe-mill contract; rather, it is equivalent to a federal regulation. Finally,
perhaps to the PG&E bankruptcy court’s chagrin, bankruptcy courts are not
vested with the power to review the propriety of a FERC action.
Exclusive jurisdiction also supports the Federal Power Act’s underlying
policy goals: more consistent decision-making, the application of specialized
expertise, and greater regulatory certainty. Importantly, all is not lost for a
financially distressed utility or independent power producer. Although a
party may not escape an “improvident bargain,” FERC still may set aside a
wholesale power purchase contract when “‘unequivocal public necessity’ or
‘extraordinary circumstances’” require it.
Lastly, in addition to other climate change mitigation strategies, FERC
oversight results in more efficient industry management as markets
experiment and adopt alternative energy technologies. Firms may be more
willing to invest in emerging technologies—such as wind, solar, and battery
storage—when they have the certainty provided by a filed rate. Put simply,
we think affirming FERC’s exclusive authority is the “answer” that helps
facilitate continued emerging energy technology development and keeps
market participants from “blowin’ in the wind” of jurisdictional
uncertainty.
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